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lines in favor of the press57 and that the judgment against appellant is constitution-
ally valid because the article was merely a commercial contrivance as distinguished
from the dissemination of news or information.58
Unless the press is to be afforded the protection to publish whatever it chooses
for whatever reason, some limitations are inevitable. The case now before the
Court presents for review those limitations which the New York courts have devel-
oped in the process of balancing the conflicting interests of the mdividual's privacy
and the freedom of the press. Since the privacy protection in New York is more
narrow than in many other states which have a common law right of privacy, it
would seem that the restriction on the freedom of the press in New York would
likewise be less than occurs in other states. Thus, the constitutional gtudelines
under the first amendment which may be forthcoming as to the New York privacy
law will be very important to every unsdiction where the interests of the individ-
ual and the freedom of the press collide in the privacy arena.
John W Warnock*
57 Brief for Appellee, p. 15; see cases cited notes 10, 11 supra.
5 8 Brief for Appellee, pp. 4, 13.
* Member, Second Year Class.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: WHAT TYPE OF LOSS WILL THE
DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT COVER?
"Aggrieved plaintiffs have scarcely known whether to sue in deceit or fraud or
for negligence or for breach of warranty-or indeed whether it was worthwhile
to sue at all."' Products liability has caused a number of problems, but California
has taken long strides toward their solution. In a concurring opinion to Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Company,2 Justice Traynor put forth his solution. Traynor
argued that when the plaintiff was personally injured by a defective product the
basis of recovery should be strict liability in tort.3 In Greenman V. Yuba Power
Products,4 almost twenty years after Escola, the California Supreme Court adopted
Traynor's view. Strict liability in tort was established as the basis of recovery for
1 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 129, 90
N.W.2d 873, 878 (1958).
224 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944). The plaintiff was injured when a
Coca Cola bottle exploded in her hand. The majority found for the plaintiff on the basis
of negligent manufacture and applied res ipsa loquitur.
3 "It should now be recognized that a manufacturer mcurs an absolute liability when
an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
tion, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. at 461, 150 P.2d
at 440.
4 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
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personal injuries caused by a defective product.5 Shortly thereafter the doctrine"
was confirmed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company.6 The term "strict liability
in tort," as used hereafter m this note, will refer to tort recovery in products lia-
bility as developed in Escola, Greenman and Vandermark.
To date California has applied the doctrine of strict liability in tort only to
situations in which the plaintiff suffered personal injuries. Does it follow, then,
that personal injury is the only area within which the doctrine must operate? In
Seely v. White Motor Company,7 there were no personal injuries; the plaintiff
suffered only property damage and economic loss. Chief Justice Traynor, writing
for the majority, held that strict liability in tort is inapplicable as a basis of recovery
for economic loss. Justice Peters, in a sole concurring opinion, challenged the
majority view.
Seely v. White Motor Company
In 1959 the plaintiff purchased a truck from Southern Truck Sales for use in
his hauling business. The truck was manufactured by the defendant White Motor
Company, and the conditional sales contract contained a warranty from the de-
fendant. The truck bounced violently, and thus could not be used for normal
business purposes. For a period of eleven months, Southern Sales, with the aid
and advice of the defendant's representatives, attempted in vain to rectify the prob-
lem. The brakes eventually failed, and the truck overturned, but no personal injuries
resulted. After repairng the truck, Seely notified Southern Sales that he would
make no more payments. The truck was repossessed, and plaintiff sued both South-
ern Sales and White Motor Company for the cost of repairs, the amount paid on
the purchase price of the truck, and the business losses caused by the improper
functioning of the truck. The action against Southern Sales was dismissed without
prejudice. The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the
bouncing had caused the accident, and therefore recovery for the cost of repairs
was denied. Recovery was allowed for the two claims which were unrelated to the
accident, namely the amount paid on the purchase price and the plaintiff's
economic loss. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the majority, affirmed the
decision on the basis of breach of express warranty Traynor then addressed him-
self to the contention that the doctrine of strict liability in tort had superseded the
warranty scheme of recovery.8
5 Id. The plaintiff was injured by a defective power tool. The court refused to allow
the use of the defenses of lack of notice and lack of pnvity to recovery based upon strict
liability in tort.
661 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
7 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
s The decision of the majority as to strict liability in tort would appear to be dictum,
since recovery was based on another ground-breach of express warranty. However, the
failure of the trial court to make a finding on strict liability in tort as to the property
damage was made the basis of the plaintiffs appeal in the District Court of Appeal,
39 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1964), vacated. The District Court of Appeal held that the trial court
was not in error, and that the doctrine would not cover property damage in any event.
The applicability of the doctrine was urged at both levels of appeal. Therefore, the sub-
ject required discussion. See Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 113, 124,
233 P.2d 74, 81 (1951); Southern California Enterprises v. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d
750, 757, 178 P.2d 785, 789 (1947). But see King v. Pauly, 159 Cal. 549, 554, 115 Pac.
210, 212 (1911); San Joaquin and King's River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County of
Stanislaus, 155 Cal. 21, 28, 99 Pac. 365, 368 (1908).
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Traynor's Opinion
Chief Justice Traynor would not allow strict liability in tort to be used for the
recovery of economic loss. Briefly stated, his reasons for this limitation were as
follows.9 The law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern economic rela-
tions between suppliers and consumers of goods. On the other hand, strict liabilitj
in tort developed to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries, not to replace
warranty provisions completely. Recognition that injured consumers should not
have to depend upon the intricacies of sales law caused the abandonment of
warranty and the adoption of strict liability in tort as the basis of recovery in
Greenman and Vandermark. Recovery in strict liability in tort results from the
failure to meet a standard of safety for products placed on the market. This stan-
dard is defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm, not
in terms of the bargaining positions of the buyer and seller, nor on the basis'of
mdustry-wide disclanners.
The manufacturer can be held for physical injuries caused by defects which
fail to meet this standard, and can insure against such risks and distribute the cost
among consumers of his product, rather than forcing the individual consumer to
bear the risk. However, since the doctrine does away with the limitations of war-
ranty recovery,10 if it were applied to economic loss the manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope. Warranty rules, which func-
tion well in a commercial setting, determine the quality of product a manufacturer
promises and, therefore, the quality he must deliver. In Seely the defendant was
liable only because of his warranty and his efforts to repair. In strict liability in
tort, however, the manufacturer would be liable even though he did not agree that
the truck would perform as the plaintiff wished or expected. Furthermore, under
these circumstances the manufacturer would be liable for business losses of other
truckers caused by the failure of the product to meet their specific needs, even
though those needs had been commumcated only to the dealer. Products should
not be required to meet a particular level of performance in a consumer's business
unless the manufacturer has agreed that the product was designed to meet the
consumer's demands. The risk that the product will not meet such demands can
fairly be borne by the consumer. The manufacturer should not be forced to insure
against such a risk.
At the same time, Chief Justice Traynor stated that strict liability m tort should
cover damage to a plaintiffs tangible property. He argues that physical injury to
property is so alan to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing
between the two.
Peters' Opinion
Justice Peters, on the other hand, argues that strict liability in tort should be
the basis of recovery for economic loss as well as for property damage. The follow-
mg is a brief summary of Justice Peters' contentions."
The nature of the damage sustained should be immaterial so long as it was
9 63 A.C. at 7-12, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-24, 403 P.2d at 149-52.
10 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964) (disclaimers do not apply m strict liability in tort). See also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (plaintiff not
bound by the warranty requirement of notice, nor limited by privity of contract).
1163 A.C. at 12-22, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24-30, 403 P.2d at 152-58.
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proximately caused by the defect. We should look to the nature of the transaction
and to the relative roles played by the parties to the purchase contract in order
to determine whether the transaction was "commercial" or was a sale to the
"ordinary consumer" at the end of the marketing chain, for the "ordinary con-
sumer" does not stand on an equal footing with the supplier and manufacturer of
goods. Thus the nature of the sale itself, not that of the resulting damage, must
determine the basis of recovery The limitation on recovery established by the
majority is arbitrary. If an "ordinary consumer" suffers a loss due to a defective
product, he should be able to base is recovery on strict liability in tort, despite
the type of loss. This would not be an extension of Greenman; all that is required
would be an application or the reasoning of that case to a factual situation which
cannot be logically distingmshed. There is no distinction between economic loss
and personal injury; each may be caused by a defective product. The doctrine ex-
pressed m Greenman is not a deterrent; it is not designed to induce the manu-
facturer to be more careful. Rather it is to insure that the costs of injuries caused
by defective products are borne by the manufacturer and not by injured consumers,
who are powerless to protect themselves. The limitation of the doctrine can be
justified only if deterrence is the purpose. Moreover, the manufacturer would not
be liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope if the doctrine were applied
to economic loss and if "defective" were viewed as being coextensive with "un-
merchantable." The failure of a product to fulfill specific needs of a consumer
would be mumatenal, for the manufacturer would be liable only if the product
failed to meet the ordinary needs of the consumer. This comports with the purpose
of Greenman.
Warranty recovery would still be applicable to the "commercial transaction."
However, if the "ordinary consumer" is required to rely on warranty provisions he
may unfairly be barred from recovery by the requirements of pnvity, notice and
disclaimer.
Summary Analysts
Chief Justice Traynor's argument for not extending the doctrine of strict
liability in tort to cover economic loss is twofold: (1) The doctrine evolved to
meet a specific need, z.e., greater protection of the consumer whose person is
injured by an unsafe product. (2) If the doctrine were extended to cover economic
loss, the resulting burden on the manufacturer would be too great. Justice Peters
argues that the doctrine can and should cover economic loss and that tbis does
comport with the purposes of the doctrine. He further contends that, if applied to
economic loss, the doctrine would not place a burden of unforeseeable scope on
the manufacturer, as was suggested by the majority.
There is substance to the arguments of each of the Justices, but neither alone
would seem to present a clear picture of the pros and cons of the issue of strict
liability in tort as applied to economic loss. Let us probe the arguments of each
of the Justices to the end of resolving some of the confusion.
Concept of Duty
The Chief Justice argued that strict liability in tort should not be allowed as
the basis of recovery for economic loss. The precedents appear to support this
argument. The doctrine was developed in Escola, Greenman, and Vandermark as
a matter of public policy in order to reduce the hazards to life and health which
[Vol. 17THE HASTINGS LAW JOURhNAL
are inherent in defective products that reach the market and, eventually, the con-
sumer.' 2 The concern of the court in these cases was one of safety. As Traynor
stated in Greenman, "Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however,
was a representation that it would safely do the lobs for which it was built."'3
This standard of safety imposed on the manufacturer a duty to protect the con-
sumer from products that have defects which will not be discovered at the time of
purchase14 and which are of such a nature as to cause personal injuries. They are
products which have hazardous defects. 15 The manufacturer now has a duty and
thus a standard of care. He will be liable if he places on the market a product
which is below the standard, that is, which is unsafe, if the product proximately
causes physical injury to the consumer.16
This duty has been placed on the manufacturer because the consumer no longer
approaches products warily; rather, he accepts them on faith, relying on the manu-
facturer.' 7 Products are so complex that the consumer no longer has the skill or
the means to judge their soundness. 18 The manufacturer has control over the goods
and therefore is in the best position to alleviate the risks which are created by un-
safe,products. Finally, the consumer's potential loss from a personal injury is so
overwhelming that the manufacturer should be compelled to protect against it.19
Such losses can be insured against by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing busmess. 20
Thus we can see that the duty placed upon the manufacturer is to guard against
unreasonable risks of physical harm. Chief Justice Traynor did not feel that this
duty was breached in Seely. A defect which causes only economic loss is not, in
Traynor's view, one which comes within the duty created by strict liability in
tort, i.e., it is not an unsafe defect. The distinction between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary but
rests upon, "an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer
must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held for
physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of
safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm."21 In
this respect it appears that Traynor has stayed within the boundaries created by
his prior opinions. He seems unwilling to broaden the established concept of duty.
12 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440.
1 3 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377
P.2d at 901. (Emphasis added.) Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964). The court in Vandermark again emphasizes the
safety factor.
14 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, supra note 4 at 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377
P.2d at 900. The court defined the doctrine thus: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."
15 Cases cited note 13 supra. See also Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.R. 363, 366, 367 (1965).
'. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
'7 Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
20 Ibid.
2163 A.C. at 10, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151. (Emphasis added.)
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The extension of strict liability in tort to cover damage to tangible property
would appear to fit into this same scheme of recovery. An unsafe product is just as
likely to injure a human being as his property, and the two types of injury are so
closely related 22 as to make it illogical to have a different duty governing recovery
for each.
Flaws in Majority Opinion
The majority opinion appears to assert improperly that strict liability n tort
would make the manufacturer liable for the failure of its products to meet the
specific needs of consumers.23 Neither Greenman nor Vandermark suggests such a
result. Strict liability in tort is based upon the failure of the product to do safely
what it was intended to do, not upon the failure of the product to meet special
needs of a consumer.24 In addition, the manufacturer is not automatically liable if
his product produces injuries or losses. The plaintiff must establish the defect 25
and prove that it proximately caused the injury.28
Apart from the above, the opinion of the majority in Seely does substantially
follow the prior cases. For example, Traynor argues that a manufacturer should
be able to define the scope of his liability outside of a physical injury.27 This would
become difficult in many instances if strict liability in tort were used as the basis
of recovery for economic loss.28
Nevertheless, the majority opinion does seem to leave some problems unsolved.
The majority position may rest to a great extent on semantics. It is difficult to
separate the duty or standard from the injury. Possibly the injury dictates whether
or not the duty was breached, for the injury may show whether there was an unsafe
defect. However, a logical application of the majority position, if this position has
been correctly interpreted, would appear to require the use of strict liability in
tort if an unsafe or hazardous defect caused only economic loss. Thus, in light of
the facts of Seely, the refusal to allow recovery for economic loss on the basis of
strict liability can only follow logically from the majority's rationale if it is assumed
that the court did not view the defect as unsafe. But it could be argued that the
defect in Seely, the violent bouncing, was hazardous or unsafe. If so, strict liability
in tort should have been the bans of recovery for the economic loss. Perhaps the
application of the doctrine will actually be limited to and dependent upon a situa-
tion involving physical injuries. In this light, the argument of Justice Peters has
more merit.
22 Id. at 13, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
23 Id. at 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22, 403 P.2d at 150.
2 4 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377
P.2d at 901.25 
"A manufacturer is strictly liable m tort when an article he places on the market
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 62, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.
26 Ibid. Cf. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d at 261, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899,
391 P.2d at 171. "Since the plaintiffs introduced or offered substantial evidence that
they were injured as a result of a defect " (Emphasis added.)
27 63 A.C. at 9-10, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23, 403 P.2d at 150-51.
28 Cases cited note 10 supra.
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Strict Liability in Tort Should Apply to Economic Loss
Justice Peters criticizes the majority for its fear of unlimited liability if strict
liability in tort is extended to cover economic loss. He argues that liability may m
fact be limited by viewing "defective" as coextensive with "unmerchantable," as
derived from the Califorma Commercial Code.29 This amounts to a new public
policy argument, in that it attempts to use strict liability in tort as the basis for
recovery of all losses proximately caused by defects in products. The Justice, how-
ever, argues that his position is not an extension of the doctrine and that the
majority position is arbitrary 0 insofar as it applies the doctrine on the basis of the
resulting injury.31 Furthermore, he argues that the fact situation in Seely cannot
be distinguished from that of Greenman on any other basis.3 2
In so arguing, Justice Peters is actually viewing the duty placed on a manu-
facturer by Greenman and related cases in a different manner than does the
majority, and he thereby attributes a different meaning to the term "defective."
As has been seen, the majority decision purportedly rests not upon the nature of
the injury, but upon the manufacturer's duty to protect the public from products
with unsafe or hazardous defects. On the other band, the duty as interpreted from
the argument of Peters would appear to be a new duty-a greater one, not merely
an extension of the old. It would be to protect the public from any loss, not merely
from physical injury. A new meaning for "defective" would thus be created. It is
no longer merely an unsafe defect against which the manufacturer must guard.
He must also guard against a defect which may cause only economc loss.
The situation in Seely can be distinguished from Greenman. To apply strict
liability in tort to the facts in Seely would place a greater duty on the manufacturer,
because the fact situation purportedly does not include a hazardous defect. If
such a basis of recovery were allowed, the standard of care placed on the manu-
facturer would be higher, and thus he would be forced to insure against a greater
number of losses.33
Nevertheless, this reinterpretation of the manufacturer's duty does not impose
unlimited liability. If Justice Peters would require that the use made of the product
be "ordinary," his interpretation of Greenman in this regard would be correct.
"To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that the plaintiff proved
that he was injured while using the shopsmith in a way it was intended to be
used "34
Peters' Opinion Applied
Peters seems to be arguing in favor of complete protection of the consuming
public. In essence, he takes the view that the complexities of our society make the
consumer powerless to protect himself from defective products, for he does not
20 CAL. Comvnm. CoDE § 2314(2) (c). (Goods to be merchantable must at least be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.)
30 63 A.C. at 14, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 403 P.2d at 154.
31 Id. at 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156.
32 Id. at 14, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25, 403 P.2d at 153.
33 Id. at 11, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
34 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377
P.2d at 901. (Emphasis added.)
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have equal bargaining power with suppliers and sellers of goods.3 5 Peters contends
that a sales warranty does not provide adequate protection.3 6 In short, he argues
that, due to the intricacies of sales law, only strict liability xi tort affords adequate
protection for the "ordinary consumer."37
The concurring opinion would have us look to the nature of the transaction,38
rather than to the type of injury, to determine whether strict liability in tort should
be applied. The basis of liability is determined by whether there was a "commercial
transaction" or a sale to an "ordinary consumer."3 9 The law of sales would still be
applied to commercial transactions, but if an ordinary consumer suffered any loss
from a "defective" 46 product he would recover xi strict liability in tort.
Two problems remain xi Peters' position. The concepts of a "commercial trans-
action" and an "ordinary consumer" would have to be distinguished and defined
in the context of strict liability in tort. A possible solution is presented by Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, through its approach to dealings between
"merchants" and its definition of a "merchant."41 Thus, a "commercial transaction"
might exist when two or more "merchants" are transacting business. 42 Another
possible distinction between the two concepts could be based on the bargaining
position of the parties. As Justice Peters suggests, when the positions are equal,
the law of sales would be the basis of recovery, and, when unequal, strict liability
in tort would apply.43 There would be some problems in using such interpretations,
but let us assume that an answer could be found.
35 63 A.C. at 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29, 403 P.2d at 157. Peters points out where the
parties are within the world of commerce, in which they generally bargain from equal
positions, the Commercial Code would apply. He also notes that strict liability xi tort
does allow the defense of assumption of risk and therefore the manufacturer in certain
circumstances could sell the product "as is."
36 Id. at 21, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30, 403 P.2d at 158.
37 There is merit in the contention of Justice Peters that the unwary consumer may
be barred from recovery due to lack of privity, notice and disclaimer. See Lewis v. Terry,
111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896) (pnvity of contract required). But see Peterson v.
Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960) (no privity
required; member of "industrial family"); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co. Ltd., 14 Cal.
2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939) (no privity required, unwholesome food); Cottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960) (no pnvity; drugs
same as unwholesome food); Free v. Slus, 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (1948)
(no privity required due to manufacturer's representations). See CAL. Com.s CODE
§ 2607(3) (a) (notice of breach of warranty required); CAL. Co m. CODE § 2316
(exclusion of liability); CAL. Comm. CODE § 2719(3) (exclusion of damages for eco-
nomic loss not unconscionable).
38 63 A.C. at 13, 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25, 28, 403 P.2d at 153, 156.
39 Id. at 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156.
40 Here "defective" is used in the broader sense as Peters uses it. It is not necessarily
an unsafe defect.41 A merchant is one who deals in particular goods, or has special skill or knowledge
peculiar to the particular goods. In transactions between merchants both parties are
chargeable with skill or knowledge of merchants. CAL. Comm. CODE § 2104(1), (3).
42 CAL. Comm. CODE § 2104; UNIFORM ComMvlERcIAL CODE § 2-104 (1962) Com-
ment (1), states that special rules for professionals in a given field are not necessarily
applicable to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer.
43 63 A.C. at 19-20, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29, 403 P.2d at 157.
[Vol. 17
December, 1965]
At least one jurisdiction has offered a great deal of support for the application
of strict liability in tort which Peters suggests. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheustan44
applies the doctrine to a situation involving only commercial loss, resulting from
a carpet which developed an imperfection. The plaintiff was allowed to recover for
his economic loss due to the reduced value of the carpet. The defect was not
hazardous or unsafe. The court rejected warranty as the basis for recovery and
stated, "The obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it ought
to be-an enterprise liability . "45 The court goes on to define a defective
article as one "not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles
are sold and used "46 The court rationalizes its decision on the basis that
circuity of action will be avoided if the manufacturer is directly liable and that
consumers should not have to depend upon the intricacies of sales law.47 Santor
and the Peters opinion present us with an approach that has merit and may yet
become the basis for application of the doctrine.
Conclusion
It is clear that Califorma is a proponent of the doctrine of strict liability in
tort in certain product liability cases. However, the doctrine is not applied to all
situations involving a defective product. The standard of duty upon which the
majority in Seely bases its decision does comport with the prior use of the doctrine.
But Justice Peters is not entirely satisfied with the status quo. He argues for what
in essence is a change, a greater duty. He opts for even greater protection for the
consumer. The acceptance of either position leaves open problems which can only
be resolved by future cases.
Will the limitation of Seely remain or will Peters' position be adopted? The
answer depends to a great extent on public policy; as Professor Moreau has put it,
"What land of society do we want?" 48 In short, is the Seely of today the Escola
of yesterday?
Craig A. Davis*
4444 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
45 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12. (Emphasis added.)
48 Id. at 66-67, 207 A.2d at 313. (Emphasis added.)
47 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311.
48 Interview with Professor Frederick J. Moreau, in San Francisco, October, 1965.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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